The politieal role ofpublie administration holds an ambiguous status in publie administration theory. The dominant paradigms of the diseipline ojfer more or less negative perspeetives. Max webers notion of bureaueracy eoneeives publie administration as the apolitieal tool of government, while the publie ehoiee sehool eoneeives it as the realm ofindividual seljishness and rent seeking at taxpayers' expense. In this unfavorable epistemologieal environment, positive eoneepts of what makes publie administration "politieal" ean hardly flourish. However, as publie authorities may organize
While Weber's notion of public administration as "bureaucracy" may appear underpolitieized, public administration presents itself as an overpoliticized phenomenon in the public choiee perspective. Viewed through these lenses, the pressing issues of public administration are those of performance and control for the sake of accountabiliry and poliey outcome improvement. Ir is about principal-agent problems, performance measurement, organizational learning, and public management. Issues of governance and administrative performance are overrepresented, while issues of civil rights protection or political integration, for instance, playa minor role.
tive performance are overrepresented, while issues of civil rights protection or political integration, for instance, playa minor role.
In this unfavorable epistemo-T he political role of public administration holds an ambiguous status in public administration theory. The dominant paradigms of the discipline give a more or less negative account. Max Weber's notion ofbureaucracy conceives public administration as the apolitieal tool of government. It is, in his conception, the "purely bureaucratic, thus bureaucratic-monocratic, document-based administration" that guarantees "the highest degree of performance" as the "formally most rational type of autho rity" (Weber 1922, 128) . ll1e contending paradigm, the public choiee or econom ics of bureaucracy school (Downs 1967; Niskanen 1971) , conceives i t as the realm of individual selfishness and rent seeking at taxpayer's expense under the veil of information asymmetries and infested by principal-agent pathologies.
logical environment, positive concepts of what makes public administration "political" can hardly flourish. Political integration throllgh administration is a case in point. Ir is undeniable that public administration provides for various degrees of civic involvement and participation beyond elections. Ir also symbolizes government in everyday life, thus encouraging or discouraging the overall loyalry of the citizenry. Organizational bodies in the public realm are able to mobilize the support of their sociopolitical environment. They do this, for example, through the participation of their clientele, through the co-optation of stakeholders, through symbolic sense making, or through the creation of patterns of identity. In this respect, public administration works as a political integrator in its own right. As such, however, it is not a prominent subject of scholarly research.
Public administration as a political integrator does have its theoretical points of reference, but they are scattered and not necessarily related to the public realm. Chester Barnard, Herbert A. Simon, Philip Selznick, and J. Donald Kingsley in various ways emphasized the tole of formal organization as an integrative phenomenon. Focusing on the balance of inducements and contributions (Barnard, Simon), on the prerequisites of individual commitment to organizational goals (Selznick) , or on the representative function of bureaucracy (Kingsley) , these authors stress the mutual dependence of organizational cohesion and integrative capacity. With the exception of Selznick, however, the inRuence of these schools of thought remained Iimited or unfolded in the research on business administration.
Ir is here that the German tradition of public administration thought is different, precisely because the history of German public administration is different. Public administration in Germany served as a political integrator long before appropriate understanding of the peculiarities of the political and organizational modernization of government in Germany, but also for the political role of public administration in general.
The German Pattern: Integrating Challenging Groups through Public Administration
While it is commonplace that the history of German government and administration was shaped by territorial fragmentation, the countermovement of administrative modernization has not attracted very much attention among historians, let alone students of public administration. Driven by the necessity of organizing and financin g standing armies after the traumatic experience with the devastating effects of mercenary armies during the ll1irty Years' War, professional bureaucracies emerged in key states of Germany from the late seventeenth century on. Full implementation of constitutionalism, however, was substantially delayed compared to the United States and to Great Britain and France, the two most politically and economically advanced countries in Europe. parties and parliaments emerged. Ir was even conceived as such as an alternative to constitutional government in the early nineteenth century (cf. Koselleck 1%7). The irony is that, while students of public administration around the world will identif}r the
Public administration in
The basis of this development was a combination of administrative efficiency and the integration of challenging societal groups. The prerequisite for a standing army was the loyalty of the aristocracy. Standing armies of the Germany served as a political integrator long before parties and parliaments emerged.
German contribution to the field in the work of Max Weber, the science of public administration in Germany is much more inRuenced by non-Weberian thought, which explicidy addresses the very political role ofbureaucracy that Weber either neglected or rejected.
The present paper is devoted to this non-Weberian thought in German administrative science and its contribution to a positive theory of political integration. Its message is that a particular trajectory of political and administrative modernization made nonWeberian thought heavily inRuential in shaping the notion of public administration in Germany. Lorenz von Stein, Otto Hintze, and RudolfSmend are portrayed as Weber's most important contenders. Their work became important precisely because it was better adapted to the peculiarities of political and administrative modern ization than Weber's ideal-typical co ncept ofbureaucracy.
• Lorenz von Stein (1815-90) portrayed public administration as the "working state," a living organism instead of just a tool of government, thus laying the groundwork for conceiving the state apparatus as a socially embedded entity.
• Otto Hintze (1861 Hintze ( -1940 gave the most exhaustive empirical analysis of the integrative role of public administration when charaeterizing the co-optation of the landed aristocraey into the Crown's army and administration as aprerequisite of stable government in early modern Germany. • RudolfSmend (1882 , finally, addressed the entire maehinery of government as an integrative meehanism emphasizing, among other things, the mutual adjustment of administrative decision making and what he termed the "spirit of the public" ( Geist des Publikums) .
Stein, Hintze, and Smend, therefore, cover both structural and idea tional elements of political integration through public administration . ll1is is what makes th eir work important not just for an
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Crown were the natural enemy of the landed aristocracy all over Europe. In France and England, the conRict was solved violendy, with either the Crown wielding absolute power over the expenses of the aristocracy (France) or parliament acting as the arbiter to balance the power of the Crown and the nobility (England). In Russia, the tsars guaranteed the ownership role of the landed nobility while stripping the latter of its local political power.
What characterized this situation in Germany-Prussia in particular-was a peaceful compromise between the Crown and the landed nobility, with the latter keeping both landownership and loeal political and administrative power while conceding to the Crown the exclusive right to run a standing army and to levy taxes to finance it. Officer ranks were manned by the sons of the landed aristocracy, typieally the younger ones who were not entided to inherit the estate. This arrangement guaranteed that the army would not be used to oppress the nobility while securing the loyalty of the latter to the Crown. Ir also enabled the landed aristocraey to keep expanded estates intaet, as male heirs were not forced to partition the property. Rather, the eo-optation of the landed aristoeracy into the army e1evated the prestige of the armed forees while enabling aristoerats who were not entided to inherit to keep an e1evated social status and an inRuential role in running the Crown's government. ll1e sys tem also had a positive impact on agrieultural produetivity, as eultivated ground was not unnecessarily compartmentalized, whieh, in turn, strengthened the eco nomic basis of the military and its administrative infrast rueture.
Moreover, the landed aristocraey remained in charge of loeal ad ministration. This was known as "patrimonial rule" (Patrimonialgewalt) , which encompassed the responsibility of the head of the local noble family for the entire range of adm inistrative affairs, including the appointment of priests. In the eastern provinees of Prussia, the head of county administration (Landrat) was a member of the loeal nobility unril 19) 8 01' even until 1945. ll1e Landrat was a representative of the Crown and of local self-administration at the same time. The Crown's aurhority in its pure form, however, stopped at the regional level of the district administration (Regierungsbezirk) wirh a district commissioner (Regierungspräsident) at irs top. Until1918, the Regierungspräsident, too, was a member of the nobility. Thus, the landed aristocracy as a potentially challenging group opposing the Crown was firmly integrated into the Crown's administrative machinery.
What was initiated as a compromise between the Crown and the landed nobility in the seventeenth century turned into a combination of central and local administration, based on professional bureaucracy as its backbone, that has shaped the structure of German public administration until today. ll1is is of obvious importance when it comes to an appropriate understanding of how German public administration works and how its political and organizational qualities have been reBected in German administrative sdence. Organizationally, the system combined the strength ofhierarchical coordination through the central aurhority of the Crown with the adaptability oflocal self-administration. Politically, it established an equilibrium between the central aurhority. of the state and the main challenging group at the time, the landed nobility (cf . Skocpol 1979,99-112 , for an account especially on the counterrevolutionary effect in Prussia).
'flle use of public administration as a polidcal integrator has remained a crudal feature of German public administration undl the present day, with a proven record of adaptability throughout several phases of emerging challenging groups and state response. Once established as the organizational form of compromise between the Crown and the landed nobility, this panern was also instrumental in integrating the emerging dass of the bourgeoisie from the early nineteenth century on, and it even helped mitigate the conBict between the authoritarian state and the working dass that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. The emphasis on peripheral adaptability and self-administration established a framework that shielded the core of the state against various challenges. To a considerable extent, this explains the resilience with which German statehood responded not only to fundamental domestic opposition, but also to phases of total political breakdown at the brink of ultimate disintegration in the twentieth century (cf. SeibelI996).
Hegel's and Weber's Notions of State and Bureaucracy:
Inappropriate and Functional at the Same Time Ironically, the very structural strength of German government and administration, based on its integrative capacmaterializadon of the rule of law. Both Hegel and Weber made the legitimacy of state power a focal point of their theories. I However, Hegel connected legitimate state power to the abstract notion of the representation of a universal common good, while Weber focused on the legitimizing effect of formallegality. To that extent, both Hegel and Weber were representatives of the "rationalist" school of thought in public administration, which neglected the "organidst" perspective on the state as an organizational phenomenon (cf. Waldo 1961) . Accordingly, the actual quality of German public administration in achieving not only organizational effectiveness and coherence but also the political integration of challenging sodetal groups was beyond their theoretical grasp.
However, Hegel's notion of the state as the epitome of reason provided a blueprint for a reintegrative myth: precisely because the structure of German government and administration was strongly decentralized and designed to enhance local adaptability as weil as micropolitical integration, a unifYing idea of the nation-state, based on reason and the rule of law, was an important countervailing factor. As Christopher C1ark pointed out in his seminal study on the "Iron Kingdom" (Prussia), it was the "apotheosis of the state" (2006, that made Hegel's theory so weil suited to the characteristics of a decentralized and territorially dispersed state structure. Hegel's theory of the state reminded dvil servants tu give their best for the sake of the state as the true representative of both reason and a quasi-religious commitment tu the unselfish fulfillments of duty. Moreover, Hegel's theory was based on the idea that the state was embedded in dvil sodety and, indeed, was the prime representative of the ethical substance of the people as dtizens. This, in turn, reminded the dominant aristucracy of their duty in terms of loyalty while at the same time legitimating their power and inBuence. Thus, Hegel's theory was characteristically ambivalent, as it contained both progressive and conservative elements as far as the relationship between dtizens, civil service, the state, public administration, and dvil sodety was concerned.
Hegel's notion of the state, however, remained abstract in the sense that neither the actual organization of government and administration in the German territories nor the nature of the bureaucratic organization as such became part of it. Weber's theory of modern bureaucracy, by contrast, did focus on the organizational nature of the state, but it did not pay attention to the empirical variance of bureaucracy and how it was linked to political integration.
Instead, Weber's interest focus ed on the inherent logic of an idealtypical organization called "bureaucracy" that ity and local adaptability, was not reBected in the most prominent and inBuential conceptualizations of modern statehood: Hegel's theory of the state and Weber's theory of bureaucracy. Hegel did not use the word "bureaucracy," but he conceived the state, and thus government and administration, as the incarnation of reason as long as it justly applied the law and as long the individual members of the governmental apparatus-read: the bureaucrats-were commined to that universal idea (Hegcl 1821,406-512) . ll1is corresponded to Weber's concept ofbureaucracy as the lronically, the very structural strength of German government and administration, based on its integrative capacity and local adaptability, was not reflected in the most prominent and influential conceptualization of modern statehood: Hegel's theory of the state and Weber's theory of bureaucracy.
was not connected tu the actual developmenr of German public administration. ll1at logic, according to Weber, was based on the rationalization of power in the double sense of formallegitimacy of political rule and the effective implementation of the legidmate will of the rulers. What became known as the typical elements of bureaucratic organization-hierarchy, legality, professionalism, fixed monetary salaries, lifelong appointmenr of civil servants, se paratio n of office and person, fixed division of labor, written rules, and wrinen communication-was connected to two basic ideas: that "bureaucracy" is a type of authoritf and that it is the most efficient and effective variant of authority.3 This was a nonempirical, ideal-typical concept (cf. Mayntz 1%5) that did not contain the slightest reference to the actual relevance of bureaucracy for the organization of public authority in recent German history.
As a consequence, prominent and vividly debated as it was in German academia, Weber's notion ofbureaucracy had no particular impact on doctrine building in German administrative science. We may assume that the main reason for Weber's Iimited practical inRuence was the gap between his ideal-typical characterization ofbureaucracy and the way in which public administration in Germany actually organized both legitimate authority and societal integration. "Bureaucracy" in Weber's sense was profoundly apolitical. Ir was just executing the political will of those in power on a legal basis. This was more or less the opposite of the actual role of public administration as a political integrator that characterized the German condition. (1757-1831), the Prussian minister and mastermind of administrative reform in Prussia in the early nineteenth century. Second, the frequency with which Von Stein is cited as one of the founding fathers of modern German administrative science stands in stark contrast to the paucity of his actual conception on public administration. Third, and tellingly, the vast majority of scholars who praise Lorenz von Stein and his understanding of public administration refer to a single notion, the "working state" (arbeitender Staat). Just as Hegel's notion of the state as the actual materialization of reason served as a reintegrative myth that was helpful for organizing the coherence of a decentralized and territorially dispersed administrative structure, Lorenz von Stein's notion of the working state serves as the keyword of non-Weberian rhetoric in German administrative science. In the absence of a coherent theory of the working state, however, many students of public administration, Germans in particular, have ascribed to that notion almost any property of public administration that is not strictly and directly connected to its formal and legal side.
Vague as it was from the very outset and blurry as it became in the course of its reception in administrative science literature, Von Stein's notion of the working state has a rational core. Kocka (1981) noted, more and more similar to that ofMax Weber, to the extent that he accepted the idea of bureaucracy as a merely tcchnical instrument whosc organizational efficiency would make up for the potentially detrimental inAuence of parliamentarianism. 1his was, indeed, a sort of Schmittian contrib ution to administrative science.
1he earlier Hintze, however, was innovative and remarkably "modern" in a double sense. He described the potential of public administration for political integration, and he was advocating a more flexible and adaptable sort of "boundary spanning" between the public and the private sector.
In aseries of pre-1914 articles, Hintze invoked the adaptability of public admin istration in Prussia during the eighteenth century with respect to the particular interests and the resistance of the landed nobility (Hintze 1896 (Hintze , 1906 (Hintze , 1908 (Hintze , 1913 . He described the gradual replacement of foreigners in favor of the indigenous nobility within the immediate co urt admin istration, starting in the midsixteenth century, and the admission of educated bourgeois civil servants to the upper ranks of state administration, especially in the provinces, and the role of decentralized authorities at the regional level as a sort of buffer zone between the Crown the landed estates, mediating between antagonistic interests and securing overall coherence of the state apparams at the same time. Hintze also gave an acco unt of the gradual containment of the quasi-parliamentary institutions that represented the landed nobility, the Landtage, through central regulation by the Crown and an increasingly detailed reporti ng system (cf. Ertman 1997). Dispersed as Hintze's papers were during his lifetime, they nonetheless provided a mulrifaceted picture of the "organic" nature of public administration, its societal embeddedness, and its potential for political integration.
Another aspect that gained prominence in Hintze's work after 1900 (cf. Hintze 1911 Hintze , 1927 was his acknowledgment of the positive impact of the economic activity of government agencies and, in today's language, the hybridization of public and private institutions. Modern or even "socialist" as it may sound, these ideas were firmly gro unded in Hintze's research on the stimulating role of governmental activity and administrative reform, again especially in Prussia, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Now, in the last phase of the dramatically accelerated process of industrialization in imperial Germany before World War I, Hintze analyzed the mutual penetration of public administration and private business-for instance, in the armaments industry-and the importance of public enterprises at the municipal level and advo cated a Aexible handling of the civil service statutes and the careful introduction of some elements and principles ofbusiness administration into public bureaucracy.
This may suffice for an illustration of how empirically saturated and both analytically and conceptually original and innovative Hintze was precisely where his work diverged from Weber's ideal-typical and normative notion of the bureaucratic state and its supposed separation from politics and society.
However, as we have seen, Hintze had difficulty adapting his lucid conception of the political role of public admi nistration and its societal embeddedness to the postmonarchical era. To him, the quasi-political ro le of German public administration was a compensation for the absence of parliamentarianism as the genuine form of political modernization in Western Europe already during the nineteenth century. With parliamentary government established in Germany in 1918, the political role of public administration, its integrative function in particular, seemed less desirable. While the left had good reasons to assume that, from a democratic and constitutional perspective, any interference of the civil service with political affairs would violate the legiti mate monopoly of power residing with parliament and ele'cted officials, conservatives, in a surprisingly similar vein, defined the apolitical status of public administration as the core of a robust state apparatus that protected government against the repercussio ns of political instability. Neither the leftist nor the conservative perspective allowed for the notion of an actively integrating state apparatus that was loyal to the newly established democratic constitutional order. The resulr was a widening gap between what the democratic order requ ired and what the main political forces were willing to concede to public admin istration as a poli tica l integrator.
Theoretically, this gap was pardy fi ll cd by Rudolf Smcnd (1882 Smcnd ( -1975 and his "integration doctrine" (Integrationslehre) (Smend 1923 (Smend , 1928 However, Sm end explicitly included public administration in his list ofintegrative elements (1928, (30) (31) . He provided the "missing link" that was absent in the conceptual framework ofWeber and Hintze as far as the integrative role of public administration was concerned in characterizing the function of the civil servant as susceptible to what he called the "spirit of the public" (Geist des Publikums) (1928, 30) . In a distinctly antipositivist way, Smend argued against legal formalism in the application of the law by the individual civil servant. He pleaded for a civil service that would take into account what is acceptable and legitimate in the eyes of the overall public. This was a definite alternative to Weber's view of bureaucracy as being apolitical as weil as uncharismatic and purely formalistic by its very nature. What is more, Smend implicitly stressed the importance of the psychological sensitivity of the individual bureaucrat for the undercurrents of public opinion, a point clearly neglected in the work ofWeber and Hintze alike.
Smend's integration doctrine was undoubtedly weil suited to justifY the role of public administration as a relatively independent power center at the expense of parliament and elected officials. In the Smendian sehool of thought, public administration was the locus of independent state power (Peters 1965), only loosely bounded by the law but committed to the cause of the common good (cf . Badura 1977; Ehmke 1960; Herzog 1970; Martens et al. 1972; Ossenbühl 1978) . ll1ese ideas became particularly influential in post-World War II West German jurisprudence and beyond (Lhotta 2005) .8 One more time, their intellectual appeal resulted from conceptual elasticity: the notion of public administration as committed to the common good and serving as an integrative force of its own right could be interpreted as both a conservative justification of robust statehood and a stabilizing element in times of political crisis as weil as a liberal defense of the public interest against the abuse of governmental power.
Structural Transmitters
As it has been stated in a different context, "ideas do not float freely" (Risse-Kappen 1994). What made non-Weberian thought so influential in German public administration was the complementarity of ideas and structural transmitters. The deviations from the abstract notion of public bureaucracy, Weberian style, did not only occur in purely theoretical terms; rather, they were practically implemented as alternatives to formallegality, organizational hierarchy, professionalism, and division oflabor within the legal and organizational structure of German public administration. All of these elements were designed to enhance the flexibility and integrative capacity of public authorities.
Formallegality was softened through an increasing use of indefinite terms and general clauses in the post-World War I era (cf . Hedemann 1933) . This was generally interpreted as a consequence of the intensified regulatOl'y activity of the state at a time when industrialization and the emergence of the welfare state coincided. Indefinite legal terms and general clauses were meant as technical mechanisms of coping with regulatory complexity. They left discretionary leeway to public authorities working under the respective law, and thus conceded to public administration the very autonomy that, in Democratic or progressive as the ideas of Rudolf Smend may sound today, they were designed to justifY all kinds of political ideology influencing the practice of public administration under the formal auspices of the rule oflaw. Ir was precisely the acceptability of political ideology in the guise of the "sound sentiment of the people" (gesundes Volksempfinden) that shaped the practice of public administration under the Nazi regime while maintaining the illusion of a perpetuated rule of law. 6 Rudolf Smend was not a Nazi hirnself, Democratic or progressive as the ideas of Rudolf Smend a Smendian sense, is the prerequisite for an independent integrative function of bureaucracyY But they also served as a vehicle for ideational integration on the basis of the common sense that Smend euphemistically ca lied the "spirit of the public," which, in practice, could easily become the pretext for submitting the rule law to the imperatives of political ideology (cf . Rüthers 1968; Stolleis 1974). may sound today, they were designed to justify all kinds of political ideology infl.uencing the practice of public administration under the formal auspices of the rule of law.
nor did his "integration doctrine" gain direct and substantial influence during the Nazi period from 1933 to 1945. But the idea of public administration as executing the rule of law in accordance with criteria of conventional wisdom or common sense was to some extent compatible with the ideology and practice ofNazi rule, to the extent that it cncouragcd public officials to act in accordancc with the Nazi worldview (nationalsozialistische Weltanschauung) rathcr than with the binding stipulation of the law. 7
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As far as alternatives to organizational hierarchy are concerned, the "corporation of public law" (Körperschaft des öffintlichen Rechts) is the decisive component in the organizational dimension. The KÖlperschaft is defined as membership based. The idea is the co-optation of those using the respective corporation or participating in its activity into its governing bodies. This panicular legal form of government agencies dates back to the early nineteenth century, at which time it was meant as an alternative to parliamentary government. lluough co-opting selected representatives of society, the bourgeoisie in particular, the reformers of Germanread, again: Prussian-public administration attempted to ward off further-reaching pretensions to full democratization (cf. Koselleck 1967) . "Administrative reform instead of constitutional reform" was the key slogan, and the creation of the corporation of public law was the key element of its operationalization. cooperation and compromise as a crucial element of the stateeconomy relationship.
as this is in the light of due process principles as a core element of the rule of law, it again underlines the distance berween the ideal-type ofWeberian bureaucracy, with its basic idea
One might say, however, that the shadow ofHege! and Weber was long enough to overshadow the strong tradition of cooperative public administration, whose strengths and virtues were (re)discovered in administrative science literature, even in Germany, only at the end ofthe rwentieth century (cf . Benz 1994; Ellwein 1993; Lehmbruch 1987) . To their own astonishment, scholars in the field of empirical implementation research, which emerged in the 1970s, realized that local authorities were constantly negotiating with private enterprises on local standards of environmental protection (Mayntz 1983; Mayntz and Derlien 1978; Mayntz and Hucke 1978) . This was not surprising at all, though, from the perspective of the history of German public administration law, with its extensive use of indefinite legal terms and general dauses designed to provide local administration with discretionary leeway for individually adapted solutions. At the time, it was nonethe!ess (mis)interpreted as a new posthierarchical style of administrative behavior (cf. Mayntz 1983) .
Inherent in the flexible application of the law by local administration is the risk of arb itrariness, agency capture, or even corruption, and thus the corrosion of the rule of law as such. What mitigates that risk under the German conditions is a fairly balanced combination of jurisprudential doctrines on how to use the discretionary leeway gran ted by the law, on the one hand, and the delegated rights of self-regulation, on the other. The combination of these rwo mechanisms enables public administration at the regional and local levels to exert a certain amount of Rexibility while at the same time developing the necessary degree of standardization and coherence in decision making.
De!egated se!f-regulation of public administration takes place in the form of subparliamentary legislation as ordinances (Verordnungen) and the charters of self-governing bodies, with the corporations of public law (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts) as the typical case.
of formallegality as the exdusive guideline for administrative decision making, and the reality of German public administration, characterized by Rexibility and pragmatism.
Last but not least, the idea of bureaucratic professionalism is not fully implemented in German public administration either. Certainly, the corps of well-educated civil servants for different strata and segments of public administration has formed the backbone of German civil service since the late seventeenth century (cf . Wunder 1986) . However, the system of the corporation of public law (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts) and the systematic co-optation of its respective diente!e into their governing bodies have led to the combination of administration by professionals with administration by amateurs. Nonprofessionals as "members" of corporations of public law have a considerable influence on the actual policy of governmental agencies.
Weberian and Non-Weberian Thought and Its Consequences in a German versus a U.S. Perspective
Ir has been stated that Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy has gained much more inRuence in the United States than in its country o( origin, Germany (Debbasch 1978, 13) . While Weber is treated as the icon of pure theory of public administration in the United States (cf. Suleiman 2006), his name is used as a formal point of reference in German textbooks on public administration at best. There is an overall consensus among German scholars and practitioners that Weber's ideal-typical conception of bureaucracy does not cover the reality of German public administration (cf. Bogumil and ]arm 2008; arm, and Nullmeier 2006). That reality is portrayed in the relevant literature as being shaped by strong cooperative ingredients and pragmatic decision making rather than strict observance of formallegality and related standard operating procedures. Non-Weberian characteristics of public administration are implicitly or explicitly interpreted-or heralded-as progressive or postmodern phenomena relative to the traditional concept of modern administration outlined by Weber. Students So what we realize is an intercultural paradox when it comes to the reception ofWeberian and non-Weberian thought. While Weber's notion of bureaucracy never became popular in its country of origin, German non-Weberian thought remained virtually unknown outside the co untry, despite its actllal inAuence on public administration doctrine building. In the transatlantic dimension, especially in a German versus U .S. perspective, a diachronic explanation (Bevir 1999, 221-64) helps us understand that paradox.
The divergent patterns ofWeberian and non-Weberian ideas and their respective inAuence in Germany and the United States are connected to divergent patterns of political and administrative modernization. Since the seventeenth century, state modernization in Germany meant not only to make the stare apparatus more efficient, but also to enhance its integrative capacity vis-a-vis challenging groups whose interests were put at risk by the process of modernization. The prototype was the landed aristocracy, whose integration by way of decentralization and co-optation paved the way for an entire pattern of political integration through public administration. This made the notion of a Aexible and integrative state apparatus attractive to German theorists and practitioners in a situation in wh ich the integrative forces of political modernization were substantially hampered. After all, full parliamentary government was established in Germany only in 1918. What is more, Germans experienced the blessing of a professional but strongly decentralized and self-governing public administration when the latter secured public order and a minimum of stability in times of severe political crisis or even the collapse of formal statehood, as was the case during the immediate posrwar periods of 1918 and 1945-46.
State modernization in the Uni ted States, by contrast, meant ea rly politicalmodernization in the absence of a professional administration (Nelson 1982; Skowronek 1982; Srillman 1990 Srillman , 1997 . -nlis made the notion of an apolitical and efficient public administration attractive to U .S . theorists and practitioners, with Woodrow Wilson's famous paper of 1887 as the most prominent example.
Hence the attractiveness and plausibility ofWeberian thought in the United States. How to harmonize a strong and se!f-confident professional bureaucracy with the principles of respo nsible government, the rule oflaw, transparency, and acco untability thus remained a prominent topic in U.S. administrative science (cf . Finer 1941; Friedrich 1937 Friedrich , 1957 Selznick 1949) .
By the sa me token, Weber's notion of burea ucracy as an apolitical tool of government never gained full recognition in Germany. On the one hand, Weber just described the overalliogic of bureaucracy as the rational instrument of the (monarchical, nondemocratic) government as it had been emerging in most advanced German 726 principalities in kingdoms si nce the seventeenth century. On the other hand, he conceived the ideal-type of modern bureaucracy as an integral part of an all-encompassing process of rationalization, pertaining to worldviews, the economy, and the organization of statehood . These analyses were of limited practical relevance for those who, at the time ofWeber's writings, had been successful in effici ently running a modern bureaucracy for 200 years, namely, rhe cast of bureaucrats itself. Weber's ideal-typical concept of modern burea ucracy never galned inAuence in the discipline that actually shaped doctrine building in German administrative science most: public law jurisprudence.
1hus, ir was because of rh e practical process of stare building in terms of modern bureaucracy rhar German administrative science emerged without a theoretical "grand design" of som.e inAuence. While Weber's theory of an apolitical bureaucracy seemed to be inappropriate given the actual political history of public administration, the contributions of his more realistic theoretical contenders were not remotely as systematic and coherent as Weber's concept of bureaucracy as integral part of an epochal process of rationalization.
Both the eighteenth-century PolizeywissenschaJt (cf. Maier 1%6) and the voluminous Verwaltungslehre ofLorenz von Stein, written in second half of the nineteenth century, remained "good practice" guidelines for the various fields of public administration. Weber's concept of bureaucracy, by contrast, gained attraction primarily among sociologists and political scientists who were more interested in the abstract characteristics of public administration than in making burea ucracy work. However, the inAuence of Hege! might have been attributable to the fact that his notion of the state as the ultimate materialization of reason not only e!evated the self-esteem of those running the state, but also, at the sa me time, was abstract enough not to collide with the actual practice of public administration in Germany.
Ir is here that the roots of non-Weberian thought and its inAuence in German administrative science are located. The gap berween the abstract Hegelian notion of the state as the guarantor of reaso n and Weber's abstract notion ofbureaucracy as the apolitical tool of government and the actual practice of bureaucracy as it had emerged in Germany since the seventeenth century was partly bridged by the contributions to administrative science delivered by Lorenz von Srein, Otto Hintze, and Rudolf Smend. 111eir ideas had rhe COIllmon denominator that the reaso n of the state in the Hegelian sense did not necessarily imply the existence of a unified, coherent, hierarchically structured bureaucracy, exclusively guided by formallegality and run by professional staff. Lorenz von Stein referred to public administration as the "working state," em bedded in civil society and responding to the actual needs of the citizens. Otto Hintze, the most prolific analyst of the integrative power of public administration in Prussia, described the logic of co-optation and cooperation that linked the power and the interests of the Crown and the landed aristocracy as achallenging societal group shaping both the organ izatio nal structure and the style of state-society interaction . Rudolf Smend gave a justification of the integrative activity of the entire state machinery, including public administration, as opposed to the notion of bureaucracy as merely executing the rule oflaw.
By contrast, the notion of a nonhierarchical, nonlegalistic, semiprofessional, decentralized, and adaptive public administration, prone to building compromises and cooperative relationships with societal groups, was the opposite of what reform-minded theorists in the United States such as Woodrow Wilson were aiming for at the end of the nineteenth century. What made the thoughts ofWilson so Hegelian in style and appropriate as a doctrine for the early Progressive Era was precisely what made it "Weberian" in the sense of advocating for public administration as an apolirical and efficient organization run by well-educated and non partisan professionals. Not only did non-Weberian thought of German origin remain virtually unknown in the Uni ted States, bur also empirical deviations from Weber's ideal-type ofbureaucracy were evaluated much more skeptically than in Germany. In the Wilsonian tradition, U.S. administrative science stressed the notion of bureaucracy as an integral part of democratic-hence responsible-government (Friedrieh 1937 (Friedrieh , 1957 and the professionalism as weil as ethical responsibility of the individual ci vii servant (Finer 1941; Mosher 1968; Wilson 1989 Wilson , 1993 .
No such strand of normative literature on public administration emerged in Germany once democracy was firmly established in the Western part of the country after World War II. Issues of accountability and administrative responsibility playa minor role in German public opinion and administrative science. The same holds true for the actual quality and enforcement of civil and human rights. When administrative science (Verwaltungswissenschaft) reemerged during the 1960s in what was then the West German Federal Republic, it was, characteristically enough, directed against the notion of public administration as the rational instrument of formal legality. Theoretical and conceptual components of U.S. organization theory, poliey science, and administrative and legislative practice were selectively adapted in accordance with what was compatible with German public administration practiee and its implicit nonWeberian tradition . Niklas Luhmann (1964 , who started his career as a civil servant in the state administration ofLower Saxony, adapted the bounded rationality-approach of the Carnegie School of Management (Herben A. Simon, ]ames G. March) in an attempt to conceptualize modern public administration as it was shaped by the contrast of formal versus informal organizational structures and the quest for decision making under the condition of limited rationality. Fritz W. Scharpf, in a short but highly inRuential study with the signincanr title "1l1e Political Costs of the Rule of Law" (Die politischen Kosten des Rechtsstaats, 1970) , which was dedicated to his academic teacher Horst Ehmke (hirnself a disciple of Rudolf Smend), promoted the idea of emancipating public administration from strict legal ties and delegating regulatory power to decentralized administrative units in an attempt to make the latter more effective and more democratic-that is, more ilHensively controlled at the locallevel-at the same time.
This tone set, deviations from the legally bounded and hierarchically guided bureaucracy have been appraised in (West) German administrative science as elemenrs of organizational Rexibility and ingredients of organizational learning (cf . Benz 1994; Mayntz and Derlien 1978; Lehmbruch 1987) . Ironically, this reRected the predemocratic legacy of German public administration as a political integrator without addressing it as such. The neglect was Weberianism in a non-Weberian vein: the emphasis was on performance improvement rather than on political integration, thus treating public administration as a tool of government, just as it had been treated by Weber. Focusing on performance alone implied a one-sided perspective on public administration that took into consideration neither its actual role as political integrator nor the risks of non-Weberian bureaucracy with respect to normative democratic standards. This is again revealed by a German-V.S. comparison. V.S. administrative science reRects the traditional American skepticism vis-a-vis government agencies being compromised by pressure groups at the expense of the rule of law, the will of elected legislators, and the overall public interest, as may be illustrated bya brief series of related examples. The co-optation of challenging groups-as we saw, a dominant pattern of governance in German public administration since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries-is perceived in the United States as an illegitimate threat to the principle of responsib le government and accountable administration. The school-building message of Philip Selznick's TVA and the Grass Roots (1949) was that the co-optation of challenging societal groups inevitably leads to goal deRection and violation of the principles of responsible government and accountable administration. Ir was only in the context of "gen der mainstreaming" and "diversity management" in the 1990s that ]. Donald Kingsley's idea of "representative bureaucracy" -the British version of "integration by administration," German style-gained some inRuence in the Vnited States (cf. Seiden 1997) . The German vers ion of"representacive bureaucracy," however, is restricted to the acknowledgment of the inRuence of well-organized groups such as the unions, peak associations, and organized business, while the integration of minorities through systematic co-optation remained a blind spot in both German administrative science doctrine building and administrative practice. lo Similarly, the evaluation of interagency and state-citizen co operation remained different in German and V.S. administrative science. A telling example is the assessment of publie policy implementation that formed a major strand of administrative science research in 1970s. In their seminal study, Press man and Wildavsky (1973) developed an early version of a "veto player" analysis that identined the multiplicity of publie agencies and private stakeholders participating in the implementation of public policy pro grams as the main factor that doomed those programs to fai!. Conversely, mainstream implementation research in Germany characterized potential veto points and interagency or state-business negotiations as components of an adaptive learning circle, and thus elements of administrative elasticity (Mayntz 1980 (Mayntz , 1983 . -nle question oflegitimate and illegitimate inRuence on public administration decision making and the selection bias of public-private bargaining (or "partnership") remained unaddressed. While antibureaucratic sentiments in the Uni ted States, as a rule, express a basic democratie reRex that restricts government interfere)1ce, antibureaucratie thoughts in Germany express a spirit of cooperative-style state-society interaction and informal decision making rooted in the predemocratic political history of the country and, thus, prone to neglect democratic standards of transparency and contro!. Accordingly, it does not come as a surprise that the inRuence of German administrative science remained Iimited in the post-World War 1I era. The dominalH topic of scholarly debate in the neid since the 1960s-the structural conservatism of public administration and the necessity of admin istrative reform (Mayntz and Scharpf 1973; Scharpf 1973 )-had prominent forerunners in other countries, especially in France (Crozier 1963 (Crozier , 1971 . Ir became even more parochial when it focused, from the mid-1970s on, on the idiosyncrasies of German federalism known as the "joint decision trap" (Politikverflechtung; see Scharpf 1988; Scharpf, Reissert, and Schnabel 1976) , while further generalizations in agame theoretical vein (cf. Scharpf 1997) were soon ro be eclipsed by the resounding success of the veto player theorem (Tsebelis 2002) .
Conclusion: Integration through Administration as a Paradigm of Mutual Learning
Tbe puzzle connected to the notion of public administration as a political integrator is that it does not conform to the standard model of democratic integration through parties, civil society, and parliaments. 1he kind of non-Weberian thought portrayed in the present paper supports rather than mitigates this skepticism. What made the works of Lorenz von Stein, Otto Hintze, and Rudolf Smend influential and undertheorized at the same time was that they aptly reflected the delayed political modernization of German statehood, with full parliamentary government occurring only in 1918. Political integration through public administration, established in the seventeenth century as a compromise between the Crown and the landed nobility, remained a functional equivalent to parliamentarization and full civic emancipation in Germany throughout the nincteenth century. 111erefore, it had no counterpart in the doctrine building of classic democracies, including the Vnited States, and it became useless in Germany as a normative concept after World War 11 without losing its implicit influence. However, there are lessons to be learned from both an analytic and a normative perspective.
From an analytic perspective, the mechanisms through which organizational bodies in the public realm mobilize the support of their sociopolitical environment are of particular interest. While the traditional perspective (Easton 1965) is restricted to the distinction of input-versus output-stimulated support (which would leave to public administration just the role of an efficient output provider in a Weberian sense), the importance of office-level participation and co-optation or the role of sense making and identity patterns for the local support of public authorities is largely underresearched. Tbe notion of public administration as the "working state" (Stein) , the German experience of co-opting challenging groups into administrative bodies as described by Otto Hintze, and Smend's "integration doctrine" emphasizing the role of the groups while tolerating the notion of"representative bureaucracy" to the exten t that public administration should reflect the ethnic diversity of society, the German pattern is diametrically opposed. Ir is an empirical question, however, if and to what extent the selective inclusion of powerful groups or "veto players" reduces standards of due process and transparencyand to what extent ethnic selectivity in civil service recruitment reduces rule oflaw standards when it comes to sensitive branches of the public service, such as immigration authorities or police forces. As recent V.S. history demonstrates, the quality of civil rights and the effectiveness of civil rights protection may depend as much on the representation of minorities in public administration as on legislation and the rulings of courts. As recent German history demonstrates, the inclusion of well-represented challenging groups in public administration decision-making bodies may not be enough to exploit the integrative capacity of the state.
Notes
1. In the Conrinenral Eutopean use, "state" refers to the entirety of government, administration , and the judieiary, while Americans will spontaneously assoeiate rhe term "stare" with a subdivision of government. 11,e language of"Bring.
ing the State Back In" used by political seientists and sociologists in the 1980s (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol1985) did not alter these terminological conventions very much, but it stimulated research on the historical soeiology of government and administration, very much in the tradition ofOtto Hintze (cf.
Ertlnan 1997 as a prominent example) .
2. "Herrschaft ist am Alltag primär: Verwaltung" (To rule in every day life means primarily: administration) (Weber 1922, 126 Herrschaftsausübung" (111e putely bureaucratic, rhus bureaucratic-monocratic document-based administration is, according to all experience, with respect to preeision, steadiness, discipline, tightness, reliabiliry, thus predictabiliry for the chief as weil as for the dient, intensiry and extensiry of performance, fonnally universal applicabiliry to any kind of tasks, technically to the highest degree of performance improvable, in all the variery of these meanings formally most rational rype of aurhoriry] (Weber 1922, 128 "spirit of the public" as a driving force of state practice provide a helpful stimulus for related research efforts. Instead of discarding these ideas as predemocratic, one might address the dilemmas of democratic integration revealed by their application to present-day administration.
While the U.S. school of 5. The three core mechanisms of integration , acFrom a normative perspective, one of those dilemmas is the potential conflict between standards of democratic transparency, control, and accountability versus the representation of challenging groups and/or minorities in public agencies. Western Democracies obviously handle the dilemma differently. While the V.S. school of thought is driven by a concern for protecting public authorities against the illegitimate influence of particularistic pressure 728 thought is rather driven by a concern for protecting public authorities against the illegitimate inAuence of particularistic pressure groups while tolerating the notion of "representative bureaucracy" to the extent that public administration should reAect the ethnic diversity of society, the German pattern is diametrically opposed.
cording to Smend, are personal, function al, and factual integration. "Functional" integration mainly translated inro integration through institutions while, "factual ll integration was lIsed by Smend as a synonym for integration throllgh public goods and services. Kelsen (1930) critieized Smend for implicit anti-Semirism bec.,"se he 
6.
For an overview, see Meinck (1978) and Stolleis (1974; 1999, 3 16-400 
